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In O'hields v. McNair' a three-judge federal panel stuck
closely to the trail recently blazed by the United States Supreme
Court in Reynolds v. Sims. 2 The court in O'Shields held that
the South Carolina House was constitutionally constituted but
that the Senate, apportioned in accordance with the fifty Sena-
tor plan,3 would be of doubtful federal and state constitution-
ality and would be acceptable only on an interim basis. The
court also suggested that more justification would be required to
support the negative residence provision, which assures a senator
to some of the smaller counties.4
The Supreme Court's historic pronouncement in Reynolds is
having the predicted "jarring" effect by requiring hastily con-
ceived legislative reapportionment, patchwork constitutional
amendment, political maneuvering and general turmoil among
the states. Typical was the recent litigation finally upholding
Georgia's constitutional scheme of gubernatorial selection. Un-
doubtedly, other predicted and unpredicted results will follow.
The holding of Reynolds, applied in O'Shields, was that the
equal protection clause requires both legislative houses to be
apportioned on a population basis in order not to impair, uncon-
stitutionally, an individual's right to vote. Not unreasonable
deviations from the strict population basis are permissible only
by substantial justification such as "that of insuring some voice
to political subdivisions, as *political subdivisions."8' The Court
cautioned, however, that "permitting deviations from popula-
tion-based representation does not mean that each local govern-
mental unit or political subdivision can be given separate repre-
sentation, regardless of population."' 7 Nevertheless, in O'Skields
the court upheld South Carolina's constitutional requirement for
House apportionment which does just that.8
1. 254 F. Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2016.
4. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966).
5. In the November 8, 1966 general election, approval was sought and
obtained for constitutional changes required by O'Shields. The requirement
for senatorial county residency will be amended to require residency in the
new senatorial election districts. S.C. CoNST. art. 3, § 7. The requirement for
staggered senatorial terms will be eliminated. S.C. CoST. art. 3, § 8.
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
7. Id. at 581.
8. S.C. CousT. art. 3, § 4.
1
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McCormick County benefits most from this provision in
receiving one representative for its 8,629 people compared with
the statewide average of 19,214. This results in a percentage
deviation of 55.1 percent compared with the presumptive maxi-
mum, supplied by the court, of 15 percent. In overlooking
this disparity the O'S'kields court may have been exercising the
"judicial restraint" recommended in Reynolds as well as follow-
ing the Court's disclaimer of "rigid mathematical standards for
evaluating the constitutional validity of a state legislative ap-
portionment scheme under the Equal Protection Clause."9
In investigating the consequences of the Senate reapportion-
ment plan,10 the O'Shields court found "grave questions" raised
because of the deviation of four counties by more than the
15 percent presumptive maximum. These counties ranged
from 15.g0 to 19.84 percent deviation. Thus, one county deviat-
ing by 55 percent may be aeceptible while four deviating by an
average of 17 percent may not. Then the court, even more
surprisingly, concluded, as to the four counties, that "there
may be some amelioration in the fact that [the four counties'] ...
variations from the norm are in the form of over-representation,
not under-representation."' '  This would appear to apply a rule
of equal protection, where some are more equal than others.
It is evident that the courts rely heavily on the use of statisti-
cal concepts in examining apportionment schemes though, in-
variably, there is a denial of the requirement of mathematical
precision.1 2 Some of the frequently used concepts are "percent
population deviation,"'13 "maximum population variance,"'14 and
"minimum controlling percentage."' 5 The first two deal with
the districts representing the extremes of deviation, while the
9. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
10. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2016. Only § 1 (50-Senator Plan) of the
act was considered, the presumption being that it had legislative preference
over its alternate § 2 (59-Senator Plan). O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp.
708, 710 (D.S.C. 1966).
11. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.S.C. 1966). (Emphasis
added.)
12. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Westberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964); O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966).
13. This term equals the difference between the actual population repre-
sented by a legislator and the statewide average, divided by the statewide
average, times 100.
14. This term represents the ratio of the population of the most under-
represented county to that of the most over-represented one.
15. This is the percentage of the state's voters residing in the most over-
represented counties, who could theoretically elect a bare legislative majority.
19671
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latter goes to the cumulative effects. What may be an accept-
able figure for these formulas has not yet been spelled out by
the Supreme Court but the O'Shieds court makes some sugges-
tions. It found a minimum controlling percentage of 47.99 per-
cent in the Senate plan to be "probably within the range of
acceptability.""' It found a maximum population variance of
1.42/1 in the plan to be "not so extreme as to suggest per se
invalidity .... 117 The court also presumes 15 percent to be
the maximum population deviation. The difficulty of manip-
ulating these concepts becomes apparent when it is observed
that these guidelines are mutually contradictory. The highest
maximum population variance achievable within the 15 per-
cent population deviation is 1.35/1, yet the court approves
1.42/1. If 1.42/1 is acceptable then the percent population devi-
ation must be higher than the presumed 15 percent maximum.
(The lowest it can be, corresponding with 1.42/1, is 18 percent.)
The irrelevance of the minimum controlling percentage can be
shown by noting the irrationality of the assumption that the
people would vote precisely in the required manner. Also, by
making a no more irrational assumption, it can be shown that
even in the ideally apportioned state, 26 percent of the voters
could elect a majority of the representatives (a bare majority of
the voters in a bare majority of the districts),18
But the problem is a deeper one than the inconsistent applica-
tion of statistical concepts or the difficulty of the use of num-
bers to measure intangible rights. The question goes to the very
roots of the objective of representative government. The depth
of the problem can be suggested by considering the following
question: Would state representation at large be satisfactory?
The practical result, of course, would be complete representation
for the popular majority with no voice for the minority on a
state or local level. But the Court has labeled as "undesirable"
a plan under which, in multi-seat counties, the representatives
represented the whole county and "the residents of those areas
had no single member of the Senate or House elected spe-
cifically to represent them."19 On the other hand, the Court dis-
claims any intimation that this system would be constitutionally
16. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.S.C. 1966).
17. Ibid.
18. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 n.12 (1964)
(dissenting opinion).
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defective.20 It should be recalled, too, that election at large,
ordered by district courts, is the usual incentive assuring rapid
compliance with reapportionment orders. The balancing of
majority and minority interests is even more interesting in the
light of the result in Lucas v. Forty-Fourh Gen. Assem-
bly.2 1 In that case a clear statewide majority, as well as a
majority of the voters in every county, rejected population
apportionment and selected traditional apportionment for their
Senate. In invalidating the plan, the Supreme Court said "a
citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply
because a majority of the people choose that it be."122 They did
not say, however, that the majority, in effect, had chosen to
dilute its own vote in order to provide what it felt was adequate
minority representation. Could the majority, then, remove aZZ
minority representation by election at large? Is the answer so
simple as one man--one vote? Is it just that "legislators repre-
sent people, not trees or acres" 23 and that "citizens, not history
or economic interests cast votes"?
2
The Court might well have felt this extension of emphasis on
individual rights was the logical approach to cure the blight of
many of our under represented cities. But, hopefully, the way
to cure the city blight is not to plow under the counties and
states. "In the last analysis, what lies at the core of this contro-
versy is a difference of opinion as to the function of representa-
tive government. 2 5 If the controversy is "the function of rep-
resentative government," at least there is no longer a question
as to the judiciary's role in determining it on the state level.
II. VOTING RiGnTS
South Carolina, one of the nine states initially affected by
the Voting Rights Act of 1965,26 challenged the constitutional-
ity of all or parts of seven sections of the act.27 In outh O'aro-
ina v. Katzenbach,2 8 the Court upheld the validity of the
20. Id. at 731 n.21.
21. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
22. Id. at 736-37.
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
24. Id. at 580.
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 333 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1966).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 b (a-d), 1973 c, 1973 d (b), 1973 e, 1973 g, 1973 k
(a), 1973 1 (Supp. 1966).
28. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). For a more complete discussion of this case, see
generally 18 S.C.L. REv. 535 (1966).
1967]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss1/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviw[
challenged sections as "appropriate means for carrying out
Congress' constitutional responsibilities . ..consonant with all
other provisions of the Constitution. 12 9 In finding the act a
legitimate means for carrying out the mandate of the fifteenth
amendment, the Court was substantially unanimous. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting in part, disagreed as to the validity of
section 5 of the act which suspends future state legislation con-
cerning elections.30 "If this dispute between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States amounts to a case or controversy it is
a far cry from the traditional constitutional notion of a case or
controversy as a dispute over the meaning of enforceable laws
or the manner in which they are applied."1 ' In addition to
"case or controversy," the dissent found a more basic ground to
be a distortion of the distinction between state and federal
power. "I cannot agree with the Court that Congress-denied
the power in itself to veto a state law-can delegate the same
power to the Attorney General or to the District Court for the
District of Columbia."
32
In other litigation on voting rights, the Supreme Court in
Clardona v. Power38 declined the opportunity to rule on the con-
stitutionality of literacy tests in states not within the coverage
formula of the Voting Rights Act. In remanding, the Court
concluded the case might have become moot by section 4(e) of
the act3" which excepts Puerto Rican graduates of the sixth
grade from the requirement of literacy in English. However,
two Justices would have reached the merits and would have
declared New York's requirement of literacy in English a denial
of equal protection of the law to citizens literate only in Span-
ish.38 There is also the suggestion that literacy itself is not a
"wise prerequisite for exercise of the franchise.136 Congress has
taken the giant step in the area of voting rights. Will the Court
for long be contented merely to interpret that law?.
29. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
30. Id. at 833 (dissenting in part).
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 834-35 (dissenting in part).
33. 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
34. The constitutionality of § 4(e) was upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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III. Rmnrrs oF T AccusED
In Wheeler V. Btate 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court,
following the majority rule,38 held that the right to a speedy
trial would be considered waived in the absence of a timely
demand. The source of this right, said the court, is the South
Carolina Constitution 9 and the fourteenth amendment. Follow-
ing the "fundamental fairness" approach to fourteenth amend-
ment due process, the court concluded that the sixth amendment
is not applicable to the states unless "the trial of the accused has
been so unreasonably delayed as to deprive him of his right to
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. °40 In any event
where, as here, the accused failed to make timely demand, re-
quested and was granted a continuance, and entered a guilty
plea without reservation of the right, any one of which would
be sufficient to constitute waiver, he was not denied due process
of law.
The United States Supreme Court's most significant recent
pronouncement in the area of the rights of the accused was in
Miranda v. Arizona.4 1 In Miranda the Court sought to clarify
its holding in Escobedo V. Iflinois4 2 and to reaffirm the princi-
ples laid down in Escobedo.
The Court very generously summarized the holding from the
rather lengthy Miranda opinion which actually considered four
different cases:
Our holding... briefly stated.., is this: the prosecution
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpa-
tory, stemming from custodial interrogation 3 of the de-
fendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe-
guards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. . . .As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
37. 247 S.C. 393, 147 S.E2d 627 (1966).
38. E.g., Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1940); McCand-
less v. District Court, 245 Iowa 599, 61 N.W2d 674 (1953); State v. Mc-
Tague, 173 Minn. 153, 216 N.W. 787 (1927). Contra, e.g., State v. Carrillo,
41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.2d 965 (1932); Flannary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204,
35 S.E.2d 135 (1945).
39. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
40. Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966).
41. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
43. Custodial interrogation is the term the Court now uses for an investi-
gation which has focused on the accused.
19671
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inform accused persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he had a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed ... 44
The Court places on the state the affirmative duty for provid-
ing the safeguards and the burden of showing that they have
been provided. "[W]e will not presume that a defendant has been
effectively appraised of his rights and that his privilege against
self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record
that does not show that any effective warnings have been
given .... ,,4r The state also has the burden of showing a waiver
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.46 No amount of
circumstantial evidence will be admissible to show that the
accused was already aware of his rights.
47
The South Carolina Supreme Court decided the case of Bos-
tick v. State48 before the Miranda ruling was handed down;
nevertheless, it appears that the correct result was reached with
the possible exception of a sufficient showing of waiver. Bos-
tick was apprehended late on the day the Sheriff of Jasper
County was killed. He was turned over to the personal custody
of the Chief of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division.
Before Bostick made any statement, the Chief "repeatedly
advised him of his right to counsel and of his right to remain
silent."-40 Yet, while still in the Chief's car and within thirty
minutes after his apprehension, Bostick made his first verbal
admission of the shooting. Later, before other statements were
made, the accused received further warnings as to his rights.
Also, offers of assistance in obtaining counsel were made, along
with advice to take advantage of the offers.50
While it is clear that the court considered the claim of the
denial of rights in the light of the "narrow" Escobedo hold-
44. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
45. Id. at 498.
46. Id. at 475.
47. Id. at 469.
48. 247 S.C. 22, 145 S.E.2d 439 (1965).
49. Bostick v. State, 247 S.C. 22, 30, 145 S.E2d 439, 443 (1965).




Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
CowSTrrUTXOwAL LAW SURVEYED
ing,51 it is equally clear that the state had demonstrated "the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination."
52
In dismissing further claims, the court held the appearance
before a magistrate to hear the reading of the warrant was not
an arraignment, that no plea was or could have been entered
and that, therefore, the petitioner's rights were not denied where
he was later provided counsel before indictment and arraign-
ment.53 The court also found the petitioner had not been denied
the right to have the charges against him heard by an impartial




In Hal v. Bates55 the appellant contended a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law from the action of the city
in fluoridating the only practical source of water available to
him. While on the facts the issue was novel before this court,
the test had been well established.
In passing upon such regulations and proceedings, the
courts consider, first, whether interference with personal
liberty or property was reasonably necessary to the public
health and, second, if the means used and the extent of the
interference were reasonably necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the purpose to be attained.56
In an attempt to show the test's requirements were not met,
the appellant contended that he was denied the freedom to drink
non-fluoridated water and the liberty to decide whether the
effects of fluoridated water would be beneficial or detrimental
to his health; that, concededy, the claimed benefits only extend
to the class of young children; and that, where the health prob-
51. The court interpreted Escobedo to require a request to see counsel.
Bostick v. State, 247 S.C. 22, 32-33, 147 S.E.2d 439, 444 (1965). "[F]ailure
to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the
right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically
made after the required warnings ... have been given." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
53. Bostick v. State, 247 S.C. 22, 33, 147 S.E.2d 439, 445 (1965).
54. Id. at 29, 147 S.E.2d at 442. The United States Supreme Court recently
reversed this ruling. See Survey of Criminal Law and Procedure in this issue.
55. 247 S.C. 511, 148 S.E.2d 345 (1966).
56. Kirk v. Board of Health, 83 S.C. 372, 380, 65 S.E. 387. 390 (1909).
1967]
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lem is not one of contagion, the deprivation taken cannot be
justified.
Pointing to the great weight of authority,57 the court found
city water fluoridation to be a reasonable health measure from
which the entire community will benefit with the passage of
time and, therefore, a valid exercise of police power.
V. STATUTORY AN-D CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
The case of Mungo v. S zedd58 involved the construction of the
constitutional amendments raising the bonded debt limitation of
school districts within Lexington and Richland Counties as to
a school district lying partly within both counties. The amend-
ments in question set the debt limitation at fifteen percent in
Richland County and twenty percent in Lexington County.
The plaintiff-appellant contended that neither amendment alone
could apply to the district since it did not fit the requirement
of being within the affected county. Thus, the argument ran,
neither amendment being applicable, the general constitutional
eight percent bonded indebtedness limitation applied. The
court, however, found this separate construction too rigid and
held rather that the entire constitution with amendments must
be construed together. Upon doing this, the district was found
to be limited by the lowest of any limitation imposed on any of
its parts, in this case, fifteen per cent. 59
A similar but more complex question was involved in the case
of Boatwright v. McElmurray.60 In that case, the question was
whether a consolidated school district consisting of parts of
three counties had been created by the legislature. If it had,
then the debt limitation would be the lowest imposed on any
segment, i.e., eight percent, and the challenged bond issue
would be invalid, being in excess of that figure. In examining
the act setting up the "district," 61 an amending act,62 and an
act63 repealing and replacing the first two, the court concluded
57. E.g., Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 892 (1954); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St.
559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 935 (1956).
58. 247 S.C. 195, 146 S.E2d 617 (1966).
59. Mungo v. Shedd, 247 S.C. 195, 197, 146 S.E.2d 617, 618 (1966).
60. 247 S.C. 199, 146 S.E.2d 716 (1966).
61. SC. Acts & J. Res. 1953, p. 342.
62. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1958, p. 1964.
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the plain meaning and intention of the legislature had been "to
unite the designated areas of Saluda and Edgefield Counties
with the School District of Aiken County into a consolidated
school district."6 But the problem arose when the legislature,
in an act authorizing the issuance of the bonds, stated that "it
was never intended that any portion of either Edgefield or
Saluda Counties be added to the School District of Aiken
County, but that a relation contractual in nature and terminable
at the will of the General Assembly ... be arranged .... r,6 In
holding that, while the legislature may repeal or amend prior
acts, it cannot construe them, the court said "a legislative inter-
pretation of [an act] .. . previously enacted may not prevail
over the clear meaning of the statutory language."66 "The con-
struction of a statute is a judicial function and responsibility."67
VI. CoNsTmuoNAL A E -imniT PRocEDuiE
Two cases this year turned on the validity of constitutional
amendments-the contention being that the adoption procedure
was not in conformance with provisions of the constitution.
Article 16, Section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution sets
forth this procedure. It requires approval of a proposed amend-
ment by a two-thirds majority of each house, along with the
entry of the proposal and the vote in the respective house jour-
nals. Next the proposal is submitted to the people. If the peo-
ple vote favorably, the amendment, to become effective, must
be ratified by a majority vote of each house, provided the
amendment be read in each house on three several days.
In Watts v. Oliphant"6 it was contended that, (1) failure to
record the Senate proposed amendment in its amended form in
the House Journal, (2) failure of the Senate to recomply with
the constitutional provisions upon the proposal's return after
House amendment, and (3) a defect in the title of the ratifying
act following popular approval, were all fatal defects to the
validity of the amendment. In upholding the amendment, the
court adopted the rule: "The question is not whether it is pos-
64. Boatwright v. McElmurray, 247 S.C. 199, 206, 146 S.E2d 716, 719
(1966).
65. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1965, p. 701.
66. Boatwright v. McElmurray, 247 S.C. 199, 207, 146 S.E.2d 716, 720
(1966).
67. Ibid.
68. 246 S.C. 402, 143 S.E2d 813 (1965).
19671
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sible to condemn the amendment but whether it is possible to
uphold it, and we shall not condemn it unless in our judgment
its nullity is manifest beyond a reasonable doubt."69
The amendment proposed in the Senate was to raise the debt
limit of both a county and the county's school district. The
House deleted the provision as to the county, leaving intact the
provision as to the school district. Thus the fact that the House
Journal entry contained the original proposal was not fatally
defective as to the school district debt limitation, since that
part was accurately entered in full. In addition, the "enrolled
act rule" precluded the court's inquiry into whether or not the
proposal received the required three readings, and that included
reading in its amended form. If the reading had been of the
amended proposal, the House members could not have been mis-
led and the constitutional safeguards would have been sub-
stantially met.
70
Similarly, since the amendment was only a deletion, the Sen-
ate had already met the constitutional requirements as to the
school district provision in the original proposal, and recom-
pliance was not necessary. "The greater included the lesser and
as to it the respective Houses were in substantial agreement."
'71
In the ratifying act, the title stated that the debt limitation
increase would be to twenty percent instead of the twelve per-
cent provided in the body. In declaring the defect not fatal,
the court restated the rule :72 "[in instances where the Title to
the Act is broader than the body, the operation of the Act would
be limited to matters embraced both in the Title and the body
of the Act, provided always that the Title is not so deceptive
or misleading to render the entire statute void.'"73 Applying
that rule the court found that no members of the General
Assembly could have been misled into agreeing to an increase
to twelve percent by the title's broader reference to an increase
to twenty percent.
74
In Moffett v. Trawler 5 the amendment at issue had been
ratified, following popular approval, in an act of the legislature
69. State ex rel Corry v. Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 225 Pac. 1007 (1924).
70. Watts v. Oliphant, 246 S.C. 402, 409, 143 S.E2d 813, 817 (1965).
71. Id. at 411, 143 S.E.2d at 818.
72. Doyle v. King, 211 S.C. 247, 252, 44 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1947).
73. Watts v. Oliphant, 246 S.C. 402, 414, 143 S.E.2d 813, 819 (1965).
74. Ibid.
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which included two amendments to different parts of the con-
stitution. Its validity was contested on the ground that this
procedure violated Article III, Section 17 of the South Carolina
Constitution which provides in part, "every Act or resolution
having the force of law shall relate to but one subject .... " The
court held that the part of the constitution dealing with consti-
tutional amendment procedure is separate unto itself and is
unaffected by other constitutional provisions as to procedure.
This rule had been applied previously in holding that the Gov-
ernor's signature was not required for a ratifying act,7 6 and in
the instant case, it was applied to exclude ratifying acts from
the rule requiring that each act relate to but one subject. 77
Emm W. WAn
76. Kalber v. Redfearn, 215 S.C. 224, 54 S.E2d 791 (1949).
77. Moffett v. Traxler, 247 S.C. 298, 306, 147 S.E2d 255, 259 (1966).
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